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Abstract
Raymond Boudon proposes a theory that explains attitudes, descriptive and normative 
beliefs, preferences and behavior, in other words: everything – or at least almost everything 
– social scientists are interested in. The basic idea is that reasons are a major causal factor, 
but there are also irrational factors (Boudon’s term) such as affective causes. This is the first 
paper that provides a detailed critical analysis of this theory. We first identify the major 
problems of the theory. One is its relatively low explanatory power: it is largely left open 
how to select the causally relevant reasons and irrational factors for a given explanandum. A 
second problem is the validity of the theory: is it plausible that a single theory can explain 
the wide range of phenomena Boudon focuses on? A final question is whether Boudon’s 
rejection of utility maximization is acceptable.
To answer these questions two social psychological theories are applied to each of the 
explananda of Boudon’s theory: value expectancy and balance theory. It is shown that the 
two theories are capable of improving the explanatory power of Boudon’s theory. They 
further confirm that a single theory can explain the explananda of Boudon’s theory. Finally, 
both theories imply that Boudon’s rejection of utility maximization is not tenable. 
Keywords: Rational choice theory; Raymond Boudon; explanation by reasons; utility maxi-
mization; value expectancy theory; balance theory; explanatory power.
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Resumen. La explicación de todo. Una evaluación crítica de la teoría de Raymond Boudon 
que explica las creencias descriptivas y normativas, las actitudes, las preferencias y la conducta 
Raymond Boudon propone una teoría que explica las actitudes, las creencias descriptivas y 
normativas, las preferencias y la conducta, en otras palabras: todo —o como mínimo casi 
todo— en lo que los científicos sociales están interesados. La idea básica es que las razones 
son un factor causal fundamental, pero que existen también, en términos de Boudon, fac-
tores irracionales, como las causas afectivas. Este es el primer artículo que ofrece un análisis 
crítico detallado de esta teoría. En primer lugar se identifican los principales problemas de 
la teoría. Uno es su relativamente bajo poder explicativo: la cuestión de cómo seleccionar las 
razones y los factores irracionales causalmente relevantes para un determinado explanandum 
se deja abierta en una medida importante. Un segundo problema consiste en la validez de 
la teoría: ¿resulta plausible que una única teoría pueda explicar un rango de fenómenos tan 
amplio como el que aborda Boudon? Una última cuestión es si resulta aceptable el rechazo 
de Boudon de la maximización de utilidad.
Para responder a estas preguntas se aplican dos teorías socio-psicológicas a cada uno de 
los explananda de la teoría de Boudon: la teoría del valor esperado y la teoría del equilibrio. 
Se muestra que ambas teorías son capaces de mejorar el poder explicativo de la teoría de 
Boudon. Adicionalmente, dichas teorías confirman que una única teoría puede dar cuenta 
de los explananda de la teoría de Boudon. Finalmente, ambas teorías implican que el recha-
zo de la maximización de utilidad por parte de Boudon no se sostiene.
Palabras clave: teoría de la elección racional; Raymond Boudon; explicación por razones; 
maximización de utilidad; teoría del valor esperado; teoría del equilibrio; poder explicativo.
1. Introduction
Raymond Boudon is the only social scientist who has proposed a theory that 
is supposed to explain every phenomenon, or at least most of the phenomena, 
social scientists are interested in: descriptive and normative beliefs, preferences, 
attitudes and behavior. In contrast to social psychological theories such as 
learning theories, Boudon’s theory is strikingly simple, as will be seen below. 
Furthermore, because Boudon subscribes to methodological individualism, 
his theory is supposed to contribute to the explanation of macro phenomena 
as well. Thus, compared with “grand” theorists, such as Karl Marx or Talcott 
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Parsons, Boudon’s theory refers to micro as well as macro phenomena. And, 
it seems, it is a testable theory. Another attractive feature of Boudon’s theory 
is that he illustrates it with numerous examples, mostly taken from classical 
writers such as Émile Durkheim, Alexis de Tocqueville and Max Weber. This 
relates the theory to the classical core of sociology and is thus rooted in the 
sociological tradition. Perhaps Boudon’s theory is the overarching theoretical 
system social scientists have dreamt of?
The generality of Boudon’s theory, its simple structure and its close relation 
to the work of major classical writers deserve a detailed discussion. It is surpris-
ing that this is lacking so far. The present paper attempts to close this gap.
In what follows, we first present Boudon’s theory and discuss its major 
problems. Two social psychological theories are then applied and it is 
examined whether they are capable of contributing to the solution of the 
problems of Boudon’s theory: balance theory and value expectancy theory. 
We apply the theories successively to the different explananda of Boudon’s 
theory: descriptive beliefs, normative beliefs, attitudes, preferences and 
behaviors. After these detailed analyses, the question is addressed whether 
Boudon – who is a vehement opponent of rational choice theory – does 
not implicitly apply a wide version of this theory. It is argued that this is 
actually the case.
Before we address the issues mentioned, it is useful to define some of the 
basic concepts. Descriptive beliefs – also called representational beliefs (e.g., 
2012a: 8)1, positive or cognitive beliefs – refer to empirical statements such 
as “X is true” or “the wages of women in Europe are lower than of men.” The 
explanatory question is under what conditions individuals more or less accept 
such statements as valid.
Another dependent variable of Boudon’s theory are normative beliefs, that 
is, beliefs of the kind “X is good.” Examples are “the state should support the 
poor” or “it is not allowed to kill somebody.” These statements cannot be 
validated by confrontation with the real world (1996: 125-126). The question 
to be answered is when individuals accept such statements.
Attitudes are evaluations of objects, but without an oughtness component. 
For example, the statements “I like to spend money” or “I like others to spend 
money” refer to a positive feeling, but do not imply any normative claim that 
one should spend money.
A discussion of Boudon’s work is burdened with the problem that he 
addresses the same questions in numerous writings and that it sometimes seems 
that there are incompatibilities. The concern of this paper is not an exegesis 
or interpretation of Boudon’s work. The aim is a discussion of substantive 
issues. For each claim discussed, citations or quotations are provided. Thus, 
these theses and claims are held by Boudon. I leave it open whether in other 
work other claims are made.
1.  Citations of years with page numbers refer to papers or books by Boudon.
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2. Boudon’s Theory
Boudon formulates the “basic principle” of his theory that he calls the cognitive 
equilibrium principle (2012b: 18) or the cognitivist model (e.g., 1996) – hen-
ceforth abbreviated as CM – in the following way: “… the fact that subject 
X subscribes to idea Y, that the subject believes in Y, can be explained … by 
the reasons that the subject has for believing in it” (1994: 3, italics in the text). 
Reasons are thus causes (1994: 4) of beliefs. Another formulation of this theory 
is: “[P]eople believe that X is true, acceptable, good, legitimate, etc. as soon 
as they have the feeling that X rests upon a set of acceptable reasons.” This 
hypothesis explains beliefs. But the central variable – “acceptable”, “strong” or 
“good” reasons – is also a condition for behavior: “[P]eople have strong reasons 
to believe what they believe, to do what they do” (1996: 140). 
The “reasons” need not be idiosyncratic but may be “transsubjective” 
(1996: 130) or “collective” in the sense that they are accepted by many 
other individuals. Reasons may be objectively wrong, but can nonetheless 
be “good reasons” (1989: 174) for a belief. Beliefs, then, may be wrong. An 
example is the false belief in the causal impact of rain dances on the gene-
ration of rain (see the discussion below). This false belief is based on “good 
reasons” which are false as well. Important for explaining beliefs and action 
is thus which reasons an actor accepts. Actors who act on the basis of good 
reasons are, as Boudon called it, “subjectively rational” or simply “rational.” 
“Good” means that the reasons are plausible in the situation of the actors.2 
To illustrate (1989: 188-189), employers often believe that replacing human 
work by machines increases unemployment. This is based on their experience 
because when they buy new machines they release workers. In the economy, 
however, new machines must be produced and maintained and may therefore 
increase employment.
What is the meaning of “reasons”? Boudon gives the following general 
definition: When actors are confronted with a question they try to answer it 
“by making a guess, a conjecture, or by applying a theory or a general principle 
valid in many cases” (1989: 176). Reasons are thus also beliefs, viz. descriptive 
as well as normative beliefs. For example, a good reason for believing in the 
effectiveness of rain dances is the belief that there are gods that can fulfil the 
desires of the tribe members. Another belief – a reason – may emerge due to 
the observation that it often (or most of the time) happens that it rains after 
the ritual has been performed. In this example, there might also exist a general 
belief, a sort of everyday induction principle, that A causes B if B occurs rela-
tively often some time after A. Thus, reasons are a certain type of beliefs that are 
2. There are more detailed descriptions in Boudon’s writings about what good reasons are. 
For example: “good reasons have the status of conjectures, principles, or theories that most 
people with the same level of information and/or interest in the question they are confron-
ted with would endorse” (1989: 180, see also 175; further 1994: 34). We will not go further 
into what “good” (or sometimes Boudon speaks of “strong”) reasons are. It suffices for what 
follows that reasons are beliefs that are subjectively considered valid by individual actors.
The Explanation of Everything Papers 2014, 99/4 485
“relevant” for accepting other beliefs – we will return to the relevance criterion 
later. One could call the beliefs that explain other beliefs second-order beliefs. 
Reasons are thus second-order beliefs. The first-order beliefs are those beliefs 
that are to be explained.
Not only reasons are causes. There are other causes that are called irra-
tional factors (e.g., 1996:126). These are, among other things, “affective cau-
ses” or “passions” (1994: 4). An illustration is Othello’s belief that his wife is 
unfaithful. The reasons for accepting this belief is the evidence Jago presents to 
him, but everybody else knows “that the credence he gives to these reasons is 
itself an effect of his jealousy” (1994: 4). There are further “non-affective cau-
ses” that are not beliefs either (1994: 5). These are, for example, “psychic cau-
ses located beyond any control of the subject” such as a “primitive mentality” 
(1989: 180). Biological factors or “consumption of some chemical substance” 
(cocaine) are causal factors as well. Further examples are “absent-mindedness”, 
“deficiency of cognitive capacities” (1996: 125), “internalization of collective 
beliefs through socialization” or “effects of cultural or of biological evolutio-
nary processes” (1996: 126). We may add factors such as global warming or 
a natural catastrophe such as a Tsunami. “Sentiments of justice or injustice, 
legitimacy or illegitimacy … include an affective dimension: nothing is more 
painful than injustice” (1996: 145). The norms themselves that are adduced 
are reasons.
These definitions imply that preferences are not reasons, they fall under the 
irrational factors. But sometimes the terminology is not clear. For example, 
Boudon notes that reasons can be “cognitive” as well as “utilitarian.” In one 
of his examples, Boudon states that there were “‘cognitive’ reasons to be anti-
clerical, but also ‘utilitarian’ reasons not to oppose the anticlerical actions and 
declarations” (1996: 140). Thus, preferences seem to be reasons. Constraints 
such as available income are not reasons, only the perceptions of constraints 
which are then beliefs are reasons.
The “irrational” causes – henceforth we will omit the quotation marks of 
“irrational” – may give rise to beliefs that are based on “solid reasons” (1996: 
128). For example, a person has been taught that “2 + 2 = 4,” but the person 
holds this belief because it is based on “solid reasons” (1996: 128). These solid 
reasons are taught as well.
There are thus two types of causes – reasons and other causes – that may 
be conditions for beliefs or actions. “Undoubtedly, irrational factors, notably 
affective ones, can in many circumstances legitimately be evoked to the effect 
of explaining beliefs” (1996: 126). Thus, “I do not in any way draw the con-
clusion that all beliefs have to be explained by reasons” (1994: 20). But in 
many cases, Boudon argues, his CM (i.e., explanations by reasons) is superior, 
and often explanations with irrational factors can be legitimately replaced by 
explanations with reasons (see in particular 1994).
How can the reasons be identified? Boudon mentions “linguistic expres-
sions” (1989: 174) that are normally used. This suggests that the actors them-
selves provide information about their reasons.
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Having a “reason” to believe something or to act in a certain way means 
that there is a belief that is “relevant” or “meaningful” (1996: 136) or “good” 
(1996: 136) to the actor. A reason is a belief for accepting some other belief 
or for performing an action. It seems that “relevant” means that the actor 
perceives some beliefs as a justification or a supporting argument for another 
belief. What these second-order beliefs are must be empirically ascertained. In 
his numerous examples Boudon tries to find out what the “relevant” reasons 
might have been. But, again, he does not provide any criterion of how to 
measure the relevant reasons.
The previous quotations refer mainly to beliefs. This is the major explanan-
dum Boudon is concerned with. But he also claims (see, for example, 2009b: 
192 – the quotation is given below) that reasons explain attitudes, preferences 
and action (see the respective sections below).
We summarize the theory in the form of an if-then statement:
If individuals have good reasons for accepting a (descriptive or normative) 
belief, an attitude, a goal or an action, or if there are irrational factors, then 
individuals accept the belief, hold the attitude or goal or perform the behavior.
One part could be called the reason proposition – if we drop the part “or 
if there are irrational factors.”  This is the proposition Boudon focuses on. A 
summary of the theory must also include irrational factors. Boudon does not 
specify the kind of irrational factors that determine the explananda. Therefore, 
the partial sentence mentioned before was added.
3. The Major Problems of the Theory
One criterion for evaluating a theory is its explanatory power (or, equivalently, 
explanatory content or information content). The basic idea is (Popper, 1959): 
the more a theory excludes or forbids, the higher is its explanatory power. This 
implies, among other things, that a theory has a high explanatory power if it 
explains a large class of relatively specific phenomena – for details see below. 
If this is the case the theory is incompatible with a relatively large number of 
predictions. It thus forbids much and, therefore, has a high explanatory power. 
What is the explanatory power of the CM? This is the first question that is 
discussed in this section. 
A second criterion for judging the quality of a theory is its validity. This 
problem is discussed in this section as well.
3.1. The Explanatory Power of the Theory
The explanatory power of a theory depends, among other things, on the degree 
to which a theory can explain a large class of very specific phenomena. For 
example, the hypothesis “if people are frustrated, they act aggressively” can 
only explain that some kind of aggression will occur when people are frustrated. 
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The explanatory power of this hypothesis would be higher if it could explain 
for which kind of frustration which kind of aggression occurs. What is the 
explanatory power of the CM? We discuss this issue only for the explanation 
of beliefs. The argument also holds for the other explananda of the theory. 
Let us first assume that only reasons are causes. As an illustration, assume that 
Swiss tennis fans accept the following belief:
Belief b: Roger Federer will win the next Wimbledon championships in July.
What may be good reasons for this belief? Let the Swiss tennis fans accept 
the following set of beliefs:
Belief 1:  Federer was among the top five players several months before Wim-
bledon.
Belief 2: Federer is a better player on lawn than the other players.
Belief 3: The unemployment rate is lower in Switzerland than in Great Britain.
Belief 4: Federer is married.
If the theory has a high explanatory power we would expect that we can 
predict for any given possible reasons (i.e., beliefs) what exactly the ensuing 
belief is. This would be the case if there is a selection criterion specifying which 
possible reasons lead to which beliefs. The theory would then state:
(1) Given a set of possible reasons r: reasons of type i cause the person’s belief 
of type i.
This would allow us to predict, for example, that beliefs (1) and (2) and 
not beliefs (3) and (4) are causes for accepting b.
It may be argued that it is difficult to imagine how a theory in the social 
sciences could be so specific. The theories applied below show that such theo-
ries already exist. To add an example from learning theory: it hypothesizes, 
for example, that a reward for an activity a has the effect that the frequency 
of a increases. Thus, very specific instances of a large class of phenomena can 
be explained.
Now assume that we do not know which reasons are relevant for which 
beliefs, that is, no selection criterion is specified. The theory thus only asserts:
(2a) Given a set of possible reasons as causes for a belief: the reasons are causes 
for some belief b1 or b2 … or bn.
For example, if an actor accepts beliefs 1 to 4 in our example, it could not 
be predicted which belief bi will ensue.
Furthermore, the theory without a selection criterion would imply:
(2b) Given a belief b as a dependent variable: one or several possible reasons 
(i.e., beliefs) may be causes for b.
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Thus, given the previous belief b, it is not specified which of the four pos-
sible reasons in our example are causes for b.
The lack of a selection criterion has further the consequence that falsifi-
cation is difficult or impossible. When we don’t find a reason we might always 
assume that we had bad luck or were not intelligent enough to find the right 
reason or reasons. The lack of a clear selection criterion also opens the door for 
ad hoc explanations. When one wants to explain a belief one always finds other 
beliefs that actors accept, and these beliefs can then be claimed to be causal 
factors. This is certainly an unsatisfactory situation. 
We have assumed so far that only reasons are relevant for beliefs. The 
previous analysis can be expanded to irrational factors. In the previous cases 
(1), (2a) and (2b) we only need to replace “reasons” with “irrational factors.”
Now let us look at the full theory that assumes that reasons as well as irra-
tional factors are relevant. Let us introduce a new term f that refers to reasons 
(i.e., rational factors) or irrational factors. The previous analysis holds for f as 
well: we only need to replace “reasons” with “factors.”
When the previous argument is expanded so that reasons and irrational fac-
tors are included simultaneously, the explanatory power of the theory decreases 
dramatically, compared to the separate analysis of reasons and irrational factors. 
This expanded theory tells us neither which reasons nor which irrational factors 
from a set of possible reasons and irrational factors lead to a specific belief. This 
corresponds to case (2a) above. The expanded theory does not tell us either 
which belief is the consequence if a given set of possible beliefs and irrational 
factors is given. This corresponds to case (2b) above.
Which of these cases applies to the CM? To be sure, Boudon speaks of 
reasons “for” a belief, as was said before: “to account for a belief, or an action, 
always try to find the reasons for it” (1994: 18). But this selection criterion 
is relatively vague. In none of his examples does it become clear what exactly 
the general hypothesis (or “rule”) is that Boudon applies to select the relevant 
reasons as explanatory variables. Just stating that the selected reasons are those 
which are relevant for certain explananda is not sufficient advice about how to 
ascertain the right reasons.
Reasons refer to subjective states of mind. So why not ask persons which 
reasons were relevant? Boudon is aware of the problems of asking subjects for 
their reasons. He mentions rationalizations (by citing Freud). We may add that 
there are spontaneous behaviors where people are not aware why they have 
done something. Wishful thinking or social desirability effects in surveys show 
the problems of measuring reasons by simply asking people. Boudon further 
notes that the reasons are generally “metaconscious in the mind of people” 
(2014), that is, people are not or need not be aware of the reasons. This makes 
it particularly difficult to find the right reasons.
So our conclusion is that the explanatory power of the theory is rather 
low. But assume the reader is very tolerant and argues that Boudon’s selec-
tion criterion that reasons “for” beliefs or other explananda are relevant is 
precise enough. But for the irrational factors there is clearly no selection 
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criterion at all: it is not even insinuated which irrational factors explain 
which phenomenon.
Nonetheless, the theory is not completely without content. It suggests that 
certain kinds of factors are relevant for explaining social phenomena. Boudon’s 
claim is that it is reasons that are of major explanatory importance. This is an 
orienting hypothesis in Merton’s sense (Merton, 1957: 88; for a discussion see 
Opp, 2014b: 174-177). Perhaps the following quotation shows with particular 
clarity the orienting character of the CM and, thus, its low explanatory power:
Firstly, social action in the general case depends on beliefs. Secondly, beliefs, 
actions, attitudes should as far as possible be treated as rational, more precisely 
as the effect of reasons perceived by social actors as valid. Thirdly, reasons of 
the “cost-benefit” type should not be given more attention than they deserve. 
Rationality is one thing, expected utility another. (2009b: 192, italics not in 
the original text)
The text printed in italics shows that the theory points in a general way 
to kinds of factors that might be causally relevant. For example, the kind of 
belief that explains action is not specified. The phenomena to be explained 
should be explained “as far as possible” as the effect of reasons – what kinds 
of reasons and what does “as far as possible” mean? It is not denied that actors 
sometimes maximize utility, but sometimes they do not. If so, how do they 
decide in which situations?
3.2. The Validity of the Theory
Does it make sense to analyze the validity of a theory if it has such a low expla-
natory power? The answer is that the theory makes some empirical assump-
tions that can indeed be empirically tested. There are two assumptions that 
might compromise the validity of the theory: one is the wide range of pheno-
mena the theory is supposed to explain (i.e., the generality assumption), the 
other is Boudon’s rejection of utility maximization.
3.2.1. The Generality of the Explananda
Is it really plausible that a single theory can explain such diverse phenomena 
as normative beliefs, descriptive beliefs, attitudes, preferences and behavior? 
This is the claim of the CM. Such a theory does not exist so far, and there 
will certainly be many social scientists who are skeptical towards the validity 
of such a claim. We will provide a plausibility test of this claim: we will exa-
mine whether two widely used social psychological theories can be applied or 
expanded to substantiate this claim.
3.2.2. The Rejection of Utility Maximization
Boudon claims that costs and benefits are often not relevant as explanatory 
variables, in particular for explaining beliefs. “Reasons,” Boudon argues, “can-
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not be reduced to mere considerations of costs and benefits” (1996: 124). The 
CM “is drawn from the ‘rational-choice model’ by lifting the restriction that 
the reasons of social actors should always be of the cost-benefit type” (1996: 
124). Thus, in some circumstances reasons are not of this type (1996: 147). 
This claim is inconsistent with major existing theories. So the question arises 
what arguments Boudon submits for his claim. These are discussed below.
But assume Boudon is right: utility maximization often does not apply. 
The question then arises as to what the alternative hypothesis is. For example, 
if the decision to prefer theory A to theory B is made, how do actors decide if 
they do not in some way maximize utility? Boudon does not answer this ques-
tion. This has the consequence that the theory has an additional severe pro-
blem that diminishes its explanatory power considerably: it cannot be ex plained 
why people choose certain options, be they beliefs, attitudes, preferences or 
behaviors. We will return to these questions later in this paper.
3.3. Summary
Let us summarize the major problems of the CM. First of all, a selection (or 
relevance) criterion for the kind of reasons and irrational factors that are causes 
for the explananda is lacking. Secondly, it is not clear what the joint effects of 
reasons and irrational factors are. These problems refer to the explanatory power 
of the theory. Another problem is the validity of the theory: is it possible to 
explain the wide range of phenomena, the CM tries to explain, with a single 
theory? This problem refers to the generality of the theory. Another validity 
problem is the rejection of utility maximization.
Despite these problems, the theory can be seen as a general orienting 
hypothesis claiming that in explaining beliefs etc. one should in any event con-
sider beliefs as major causes. In the 21th century this is hardly a very exciting 
advice, it is rather a truism in the social sciences.
4.  How to Select the Causal Factors: Applying Social Psychological 
Theories to Evaluate Boudon’s Theory
How can the CM be improved? One possibility is to compare the CM with 
social psychological theories that are widely applied in social psychology. This 
is possible because these theories address at least some of the explananda of the 
CM. If this is the case it can be examined to what extent the theories give more 
specific guidelines to select the relevant factors in order to explain relatively 
specific explananda. Thus, we examine to what extent there are theories that 
could improve the explanatory power of the CM.
Applying social psychological theories may further shed light on the vali-
dity of the CM. To what extent do the theories encompass the wide range of 
explananda Boudon tries to explain? If they do not, is it plausible to expand 
their range of explananda? This is a plausibility test of Boudon’s generality 
assumption that holds that only one theory is needed to explain everything 
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from beliefs to actions. Secondly, applying the theories is a test of Boudon’s 
rejection of utility maximization. Do the theories make this assumption, or is 
there an alternative hypothesis?
It is striking that Boudon never systematically compared his CM with 
existing social psychological theories. We don’t know whether he had “good 
reasons” for this. It seems that there are no good reasons not to apply social 
psychological theories. On the contrary, the good reasons for applying social 
psychological theories are that they could improve the CM or confirm some 
of its assumptions. Furthermore, the social psychological theories could be 
improved by expanding their explananda.
There are numerous social psychological theories. We selected two theories 
that are widely applied in social psychology and that might solve the selection 
problem: one is balance theory (e.g., Heider, 1958, see also van de Rijt, 2011 
with further references), the other value expectancy theory (e.g., Feather, 1982, 
1990; for an overview see Wigfield, Tonks and Klauda, 2009).
The two theories are applied to each of the explananda of the CM: des-
criptive beliefs, normative beliefs, attitudes, preferences and action. For each 
explanandum the focus is thus on the following questions. (1) Do the theories 
include reasons as major variables? (2) Do the theories show how reasons as 
well as irrational factors influence explananda? (3) Are the theories capable of 
explaining the wide range of phenomena Boudon wants to explain with his 
theory? (4) Do the theories assume some version of utility maximization?
5. Explaining Descriptive Beliefs
We will begin with one of Boudon’s major examples and then examine to 
which extent two major theories can be applied to solve the problems of the 
CM, based on the example. These theories are balance theory and value expec-
tancy theory.
5.1. An Example: Explaining the Belief in the Effectiveness of Rain Rituals
One of Boudon’s examples to illustrate his theory is taken from Émile 
Durkheim’s “Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse” (first 1912, see Book 
III, chapter II).3 Durkheim explains why tribes of central Australia believed that 
rain rituals generated rain. To be sure, the tribes had empirical knowledge about 
how plants grow and die. Thus, there are correct beliefs that include, among 
other things, information about the importance of water for the growing of 
plants. But the tribes did not have at their disposal the results of modern scien-
3. This subsection is largely based on Boudon (2014) which was submitted to a special issue of 
the Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie shortly before his death. This paper 
thus contains the last version of the CM. Therefore, I use this paper. Page numbers are not 
included in quotations because the paper has not yet been published. For the explanation 
of magical beliefs see also Boudon (1989).
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ce implying that rituals do not generate rain. According to Durkheim (1915: 
25-26), for the “primitive man … there is nothing strange in the fact that by 
a mere word or gesture one is able to command the elements, … bring rain or 
cause it to cease.” The rites “do not appear more irrational … to his eyes than 
the technical processes of which agriculturists make use.” In other words, the 
“primitive men” have good reasons for engaging in the rain rituals.
Shouldn’t the tribe members learn over time that there is no causal effect 
of their ritual on rain? There are several “good reasons” for keeping the false 
belief. First of all, the rituals are practiced at a time when rain is likely to fall 
anyway. There is thus a relatively close temporal association between the ritual 
and the rain. The belief of the effectiveness of the ritual is thus, as Boudon 
writes, “rational”: scientists would use the same rule of inference. Second, if it 
turns out that sometimes rituals do not work tribes use auxiliary hypotheses. 
One might be that the rituals were not performed in the right way.
A third reason for the persistence of the belief about the effectiveness of 
the rain ritual is the existence of a general belief that is backed by numerous 
everyday experiences: if an action is only sometimes successful it is unlikely 
that it will be completely unsuccessful in the future. For example, if phone 
calls are sometimes not answered that does not mean that phone calls remain 
always unanswered. However, if an action is always successful for a relatively 
long period of time and then suddenly the outcome does not occur anymore, 
the likelihood is very low that the outcome will occur later. This is consistent 
with hypotheses about intermittent reinforcement in learning theory (see, for 
example, Ferster and Skinner, 1957 and any textbook on learning theory like 
Schwartz and Reisberg, 1991). Applied to the belief in the effectiveness of the 
rain rituals, tribe members will trust the success of the ritual even if it some-
times does not work. 
A fourth reason for the stability of the effectiveness belief is that ineffecti-
veness is explained by some action of other groups:
The efficacy of these rites is never doubted by the native: he is convinced that 
they must produce the results he expects, with a sort of necessity. If events 
deceive his hopes, he merely concludes that they were counteracted by the 
sorcery of some hostile group. In any case, it never enters his mind that a 
favourable result could be obtained by any other means. If by chance the vege-
tation grows or the animals produce before he has performed his Intichiuma, 
he supposes that another Intichiuma has been celebrated under the ground 
by the ancestors and that the living reap the benefits of this subterranean 
ceremony. (1915: 333)
This is a strategy to immunize the belief of the effectiveness of rain rituals 
against falsification. Another belief makes the ineffectiveness assumption plau-
sible: the ritual leads to rain because god or the gods make the rain, and the 
dance is supposed to prompt the gods to let it rain. There is thus a whole 
set of “good” reasons that the Australians had for their false belief about the 
effectiveness of rain rituals.
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The example clearly shows the problems of the CM: why are the “reasons” 
Boudon mentions the real causes? What is the role of irrational factors? There 
is no systematic analysis of these factors. What could they be? Beliefs are often 
transsubjective – as Boudon puts it –, that is, shared by others, and there is 
joint action as in the example of the rain rituals. An individual may accept a 
shared belief because he or she is afraid of sanctions: the tribe members put 
pressure on each other to accept beliefs. This would be an affective cause and 
not a reason for accepting a belief. Are there other irrational factors and how 
important are they, compared to reasons? These questions are not answered. 
5.2. The Application of Balance Theory
We first provide a short introduction to balance theory (BT). The reader 
who is familiar with this theory might skip this part. We will then apply the 
theory to the example. The question is to what extent the theory can solve the 
problems of the CM.
5.2.1. A Short Introduction to and Application of Balance Theory
We begin with modeling irrational causes. Assume a tribe member, person p, 
is a friend of another person o (or a set of other persons o). For some reason p 
does not yet accept that rain dances generate rain. Let p learn that o has this 
belief x (i.e., that rain dances lead to rain). These three objects – p, o and x – 
can be depicted in a plane, as figure 1 shows. Graph A shows two relationships: 
Figure 1. Application of Balance Theory to Explain the False Belief about the Effectiveness 
of the Rain Dance.
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p likes o and p perceives that o believes x. There are thus a liking relationship L 
(such as friendship) and a unit relationship U (such as a belief x of a person p). 
The relationships in such a pox system may be of different kinds: they may 
be positive or negative (e.g., p may like or dislike o) or they may be present 
or absent. For example, p might not yet have an opinion about x (graph A of 
figure 1). Relationships may further have different intensities, but we will only 
assume that relationships are present or absent, and, if present, can be positive 
or negative. This suffices in this context. 
Certain distributions of lines are defined as balanced or unbalanced. For 
example, if all three connections in a pox system are positive there is balance. 
If two relationships are negative and one positive there is balance as well. 
However, if one is negative and two are positive there is imbalance. Balance 
is a psychologically pleasant state, imbalance an unpleasant one. To illustra-
te, assume p has the same beliefs as o and o is p’s friend. This means that all 
three relationships are positive (see graph B of figure 1). Apparently, it is a 
pleasant feeling when I share my friend’s beliefs. However, if the beliefs of my 
friend and me differ this is unpleasant. For example, if o approves of terrorist 
activities x and I disapprove of these activities this is certainly unpleasant. It is 
also unpleasant when I realize that my friend believes x but that I have not yet 
have formed a belief about x, that is, there is no relationship between p and x 
(see part A of figure 1). Thus, the pox system is incomplete. It would be more 
pleasant if I would believe x as well. Balance theory (BT) hypothesizes, among 
other things, that a lacking relationship in a pox system yields imbalance and 
is thus unpleasant. 
So far we have defined balance and imbalance. A proposition is that indivi-
duals try to change unbalanced states. In our example, balance would exist if 
p adopts the same belief as o (see the upper right part B of figure 1).
If a pox system is in an unbalanced state, balance can be brought about by 
several changes. For example, the imbalance of graph A in figure 1 has been 
removed by adding a line between p and x  (i.e., p adopted belief x; see graph 
B). There could have been another reaction by p (see graph C of figure 1): p 
could reject the belief x (i.e., px would become negative) and at the same time 
terminate friendship with o (po would thus become negative). This would 
result in a balanced state as well. It is not unpleasant if my beliefs differ from 
the beliefs of people that I don’t like.
Would p prefer the situation depicted in graph B or C? BT assumes that 
those balanced graphs which require a relatively low number of changes 
are preferred. The underlying idea is that changing a relationship is costly. 
One thus prefers a balanced state that requires a relatively low number of 
changes. Had we introduced intensities, an additional assumption is that the 
lines with the lowest intensities are most likely to be changed. For example, 
assume p is quite sure that o believes x and that p could not find any evi-
dence that this belief is wrong. So ox is strong. In addition, let po be strong 
as well. Thus, for p the least costly change that leads to balance is to add px 
(graph B).
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The pox system can be extended. For example, there could be other beliefs 
(other x’s) that are consistent or inconsistent with x (i.e., there may be positive 
or negative unit relationships with x). For example, x may follow from several 
religious beliefs. Furthermore, there may be other persons with different rela-
tionships to p. We will not discuss more details because this is not necessary 
for the following analysis.
5.2.2. Some Implications
This very short introduction to BT suffices to illustrate the following points.
(1) BT explains, among other things, beliefs. It is thus possible to compare BT 
with the CM.
(2) BT specifies a relevance criterion. For example, px originates because it 
makes p better off. Graph C is not chosen because this is costlier than 
graph B. What about the belief that apples are healthy or that capital 
punishment does not deter crime? Assume we add these beliefs as elements 
u and v in graph A. They would be irrelevant because there would not be a 
relationship of these elements to x and o. But if p perceives that o believes 
in the deterrence effect of capital punishment then this would be relevant 
for p’s psychic well-being. 
(3) BT includes irrational factors. A liking relation is not a second-order belief, 
it is an “affective” relationship. Nonetheless, BT explicitly includes this 
kind of factor, together with reasons in Boudon’s sense. Among the irra-
tional factors are preferences as well. We could extend the pox system by 
assuming that p has a strong motivation to adhere to the norm to participa-
te in the rain dances. The norm could be added as an additional object z in 
the graphs. A preference for adhering to the norm is a positive line between 
p and z. Thus, irrational factors are included in the theory. Furthermore, 
BT integrates both factors. There is no need to distinguish rational and 
irrational factors.
(4) An underlying assumption of BT is that there is cognitive optimization or, 
put differently, cognitive utility maximization. In the example, actors do 
not choose the cognitive structure C but B. The reason is that B is more 
pleasant or less costly than C. In other words, actors are better off when 
they choose B instead of C. This is clearly not in line with Boudon’s claim 
that acquiring or changing beliefs has nothing to do with costs and benefits 
and utility maximization.
(5) BT provides some evidence for Boudon’s generality assumption (a single 
theory can explain everything from beliefs to action). Lines between cogni-
tive elements may refer to beliefs (including norms), attitudes, preferences 
and behaviors.
The previous example suggests extending Boudon’s use of the term “reason.” 
Reasons are, by definition, beliefs but not feelings. It makes sense to say that 
p’s friendship with o is a “good reason” to adopt belief x because otherwise o 
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would terminate the friendship relationship. In everyday language, it is cer-
tainly a “good reason” to do something in order to achieve a goal and to avoid 
an unpleasant state of affairs. This suggests that perhaps the meaning of “rea-
sons” should be changed. It could refer to beliefs as well as motivational states.
5.3. Applying Value Expectancy Theory
The theory is usually applied to explain behavior and not beliefs. According 
to Boudon’s generality assumption it seems plausible to expand the range of 
application of value expectance theory (VET) to explain beliefs as well. We 
will first provide a short introduction to VET and then explore its capability 
to explain beliefs.4
5.3.1. A Short Introduction to Value Expectancy Theory 
The theory asserts that among at least two perceived behavioral alternatives the 
action with the highest subjective expected utility (SEU) is chosen. This overall 
utility for a behavior is computed in the following way. A first step is to find 
the perceived behavioral alternatives to a behavior that is to be explained. In 
a second step the behavioral consequences for each perceived alternative must 
be ascertained. For each consequence, the expected subjective probability and 
utility (valuation) must be determined. The sum of the product terms of each 
behavioral consequence for a given behavioral alternative is, by definition, 
equal to the SEU of the respective behavior. This is its overall utility. The 
empirical proposition is: a person chooses the behavioral alternative that has 
the highest SEU. The theory becomes more understandable when we apply 
it to our example.
5.3.2. An Application of VET to Explain the Belief about the Effectiveness of the 
Rain Dance
VET explains behavior. If its range of application is expanded to explain 
beliefs, the subjective expected utility should refer to holding a belief (instead 
of performing an action). The SEU should depend on the likelihood and 
utility of the consequences of holding a belief, from a set of alternative beliefs. 
Is this a plausible expansion of VET?
In order to answer this question we apply VET to our example: can VET 
explain the adoption of the false belief B about the likelihood that rain dances 
lead to rain? A first consequence of holding B is that the individual i’s belief 
matches the beliefs of friends. It is assumed that having the same belief as one’s 
friends is beneficial (i.e., it has a positive utility for the actor). This is the same 
assumption that was made when we applied balance theory. However, VET 
introduces the subjective probability p that the beliefs of i and his or her friends 
match. For the members of the Australian tribe this probability is probably 
4. There is little work that applies this theory to the explanation of beliefs. See in particular 
Breen (1999), Matsueda et al. (2006), Breen and Goldthorpe (1997), and Becker (2013).
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1 because everybody knows that everybody else accepts this belief. In other 
situations, however, p may be smaller than 1.
A further consequence of holding B is that it is consistent with the religion 
(or a set of religious beliefs) that i accepts. If this is the case, this is certainly 
pleasant for i. If i observes that rain regularly follows the rain dance it would be 
unpleasant for i not to believe in the causality of the rain dance. Finally, i may 
be relatively sure that his or her dance influences the intention of the gods to 
let it rain. Such action is beneficial for i because i believes that this intention 
will lead to the respective action.
Let us formulate this argument more precisely. We write an equation that 
consists of the single product terms and thus defines the SEU of holding a 
belief. We introduce the following abbreviations:
Bi = individual i’s belief that rain rituals generate rain
SEU = subjective expected utility of holding belief Bi
5
p = subjective probability that the consequence occurs
U = utility
The equation for the SEU of B is as follows:
(1) SEUi (Descriptive belief Bi) = pBF · U(Consistency with friends’ B) + pBR · 
U(Religion is consistent with belief Bi) + pBO · U(Observation that rain follows 
the dance is consistent with Bi) + pBR · U(Ritual activates Gods’ intention to 
make rain)
The right-hand side of the equation consists of product terms. Each of the 
product terms consists of a probability that the consequence occurs, given the 
belief B. The first subscript refers to the dependent variable B, the second to 
the utility term. This probability could be different if the belief is not held.
A second equation should be added for the SEU for not accepting belief B 
or for accepting perceived alternatives to B. In this equation (or in such equa-
tions), the probabilities on the right hand side could be lower than those in 
the first equation, perhaps even zero. This means that not believing B would 
in all likelihood not have the consequences mentioned before. The utilities 
would be the same as in the first equation. The lower probabilities imply that 
the SEU of the first equation is higher than the SEU of the second equation 
and that, according to VET, B will be accepted.
5.3.3. Some Implications
The implications are very similar to those for BT. 
(1) The previous analysis suggests that VET can explain beliefs. This supports 
Boudon’s generality assumption: it is plausible that VET can explain descrip-
5. We assume that in the example “belief” is a dichotomous variable: one may or may not have 
the belief in the effectiveness of the rain ritual. Were we to distinguish between degrees of 
beliefs, we would need an equation for each degree. 
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tive beliefs. Whether the other explananda can be explained remains to be 
seen.
(2) VET specifies the kind of belief that is to be explained, and thus includes 
a relevance or selection criterion. It holds that only those consequences are 
relevant that are related to the SEU of the belief B. This implies, for exam-
ple, that the belief that apples are healthy would not be included.
(3) The example includes utilities and thus irrational factors. Furthermore, 
VET integrates reasons (in this case subjective probabilities) and irrational 
factors in the product terms. Again, there is no need to distinguish between 
rational and irrational factors. It is shown how both factors determine the 
origin of beliefs. 
(4) VET clearly assumes a kind of utility maximization. The hypothesis that the 
action with the highest SEU is chosen means that the actor chooses among 
the given options the one that is best for him, given his or her subjective 
beliefs and utilities. This is thus not consistent with Boudon’s rejection of 
utility maximization. 
The CM does not include the terms “utilities” and “subjective probabili-
ties.” However, the previous argument can easily reformulated by using Bou-
don’s terminology: one could say that each of the consequences provides a 
“good reason” – referring to the values of the subjective probabilities – for 
adopting the false belief. The utilities are not to be regarded as reasons. The 
suggested change of the terminology seems useful here as well: why not say 
that high utilities are good reasons as well?
The conclusions of applying VET are the same as the conclusions of apply-
ing BT: VET remedies some deficiencies of the CM. Our reformulation con-
firms Boudon’s idea that one theory can explain the different phenomena the 
CM comprises.
6. The Explanation of Normative Beliefs
In discussing Boudon’s explanation of normative beliefs we will proceed in the 
same way as before: we will first describe an example that illustrates the CM 
and then discuss the theory, based on the example, by applying BT and VET.
6.1. An Example: Why Should Miners Get a Higher Salary than Soldiers?
Boudon’s example is taken from Adam Smith’s “An Inquiry into the Nature 
and Causes of the Wealth of Nations” (1776, Book I, Chapter X, Part I.).6 The 
question is why there is a strong feeling among 18th-century Englishmen that 
miners should be paid higher wages than soldiers. The issue is thus to explain 
a norm. Boudon’s explanation is as follows. A salary is a reward. There is a 
6. Boudon describes this example in several publications, for example in 1996: 146; 2009a: 
36-43. The following is based on Boudon (2014).
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general norm that rewards should correspond to contributions to the society. 
Thus, miners and soldiers should get the same salary if their contributions are 
equal, as they are valued by the population. Contributions consist of invest-
ments that are necessary to acquire the competence needed to accomplish the 
contributions, and the risk involved in bringing about the contributions. The 
investment and risks are similar for soldiers and miners. 
However, the social meaning of the activities of soldiers and miners is differ-
ent. Soldiers preserve the existence of the nation, whereas miners perform only 
economic activities. Furthermore, a soldier’s death is considered a sacrifice, 
whereas the death of a miner is an accident. The soldier thus gets symbolic 
rewards “in terms of moral prestige, symbolic distinctions, glory notably when 
he has won a battle.” These rewards do not accrue to the miner. If the salaries 
of the miners were not higher, “an unjustifiable disequilibrium between the 
contributions and the rewards of the two categories would appear.”
6.2. Applying Balance Theory to Explain Normative Beliefs
The explanandum in the previous section referred to a descriptive belief, and 
it was assumed that important others such as friends accept the belief. As long 
as p has not formed a belief about the effectiveness of the rain ceremony the 
situation was unbalanced (see figure 1). Two changes in p’s cognitive system 
were discussed.
Now assume that x is not a descriptive but a normative belief (viz., the 
belief that miners should get higher wages than soldiers). We call this the wage 
norm. As in figure 1, there is a unit relationship ox (p perceives that o accepts 
norm x) and a liking relationship between p and o. Assume further that p has 
not yet decided whether the norm about the different wages of miners and 
soldiers is acceptable (see figure 2, graph A). This is an unbalanced state, as 
described before. Accepting the normative belief yields balance (see graph B 
in figure 2). A balanced state would also be achieved if p rejects the norm and 
terminates friendship with o (graph C). However, balance theory assumes that 
B is preferable to C, as was said before.
Note that the type of x is irrelevant in BT: x may be a descriptive or norma-
tive belief or any other object (such as a third person q). Only the structure of 
the graph (i.e., the distribution of positive or negative relationships between 
cognitive elements), and thus balance or imbalance, is of importance.
The example from Adam Smith also refers to relationships between norms: 
there is a general norm about fairness of rewards and a special norm about the 
fairness of wages. The latter norm is implied by the general norm. This situ-
ation is depicted in figure 3. Assume p accepts a general norm g and believes 
that a special norm s follows from g. It would be a balanced state when p also 
accepts s. A negative line from p to s would yield imbalance and would thus 
be costly.
Note that the perceived implication of norm s is important, not the actual 
implication. It may thus be the case that p does not think that s follows from g. For 
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example, p may think that symbolic rewards must not be counted in deter-
mining overall rewards. Thus, it is not the logical relationships between norms 
but the psycho-logical relationships which are relevant. Note further that even 
in a logical argument where a norm follows from a set of statements that 
include a norm utilities are involved.
In the previous section about descriptive beliefs some implications of the 
application of BT to explain descriptive beliefs and its compatibility with the 
CM were discussed. The points that were made there fully apply to the expla-
nation of normative beliefs as well. So we need not repeat these implications.
6.3. Value expectancy theory
In applying VET, the dependent variable would not be a descriptive belief 
that something is the case but a normative belief that something should 
Figure 2. Application of Balance Theory to Explain the Norm about Fair Wages.
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be the case. If one holds the specific norm s that soldiers should get lower 
wages than miners, a perceived behavioral consequence is that one follows 
a general norm g which is beneficial (i.e., provides utility). VET allows us 
to introduce subjective probabilities. In the extreme case, an actor may be 
certain that norm s is implied by norm g. However, the probability need not 
be 1, that is, there may be some doubt about the implication. The equation 
would thus read:
(2) SEU (Belief that norm s holds) = pSG · U(s is implied by the general 
Norm g)
This equation includes only one behavioral consequence. We could add 
others. For example, the belief in norm s could be compatible with the norma-
tive expectations of friends. We will not add further components because our 
goal is only to show that VET can be applied. 
In the discussion of descriptive beliefs, several implications of VET were 
discussed. The points made there hold for the application of VET to explain 
normative beliefs as well.
7. Explaining Attitudes and Preferences
In this section, we will first present a version of VET to explain attitudes 
because this version – the Fishbein-Ajzen theory – is well confirmed and widely 
used in social psychology. Based on this analysis we will apply BT. This is an 
easy exercise because we can build on our previous analyses.
7.1. Applying Value Expectancy Theory to Explain Attitudes
Boudon does not explicitly deal with the explanation of attitudes, although 
he sometimes mentions them (e.g., 2001: 200). Furthermore, it seems that he 
does not clearly distinguish between attitudes and norms. An attitude is, by 
definition, a positive valuation without any implication of oughtness. The lack 
of distinction between attitudes and norms is apparent when Boudon discusses 
the example that people may “prefer” to drive relatively fast in the city and 
for this reason regard traffic lights as a “good” (yet unpleasant) thing. This is 
because “traffic is more fluid with traffic lights than without.” Therefore, the 
“value statement” that “traffic lights are a good thing” is accepted (Boudon, 
2001: 150-151, italics in Boudon’s text). It can be doubted that the previous 
statement – “traffic lights are a good thing” – is a norm. The term “good” 
may mean “effective” and, thus, may express the fact that traffic lights prevent 
accidents or make traffic faster. Furthermore, “good” may refer to a positive 
attitude toward the consequences of traffic lights. This implies that oughtness 
or morality is not involved. In general, traffic rules are just conventions that 
serve some purpose, and one does not have a bad conscience when they are 
violated, and there is no intrinsic valuation.
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When discussing his example, Boudon explains the valuation of traffic 
lights by the fact that existing traffic lights have consequences that people like 
(or consider “good”). This argument is consistent with the well-confirmed 
attitude theory by Fishbein and Ajzen (see, e.g., 2009). The theory hypoth-
esizes that there will be a positive attitude towards an object if an individual 
associates with this object positive features with high subjective probability. 
This is also held by VET, but the dependent variable there is attitudes and 
not behaviors.
Let us apply this version of VET to Boudon’s example of the rain dances. 
One would predict that the Australians do not only engage in the rain dances 
as an instrumental activity (i.e., to bring about rain), but that they also like 
the dances or participation in the dances. Thus, a positive attitude toward the 
rain dance develops. What might be the “good reasons”? The explanation of 
the Fishbein-Ajzen theory would be that the rain dances are associated with 
very positive features. One is the rain. Furthermore, the members of the tribe 
might enjoy the social gatherings for their own sake.
A simplified example of an equation of VET where the dependent vari-
able is an attitude (i.e., the SEU of having a positive attitude toward the rain 
dance) is the following:
(3) SEU(Attitude toward the rain dance) = pAR · U(Rain) + pAF · U(Friends 
present)
Thus, the tribe members will like participating in the rain dance (i.e., they 
have a positive attitude toward the attitude object “rain dance”) if the subjec-
tive probability pAR that it rains and the utility U of rain is high and, further-
more, if it is likely that friends are present and if this has a high utility as well.
7.2. Explaining Preferences with Value Expectancy Theory
Attitudes differ from goals or preferences, but it often happens that goals 
develop if objects are valued positively. For example, if someone values com-
puters very positively he or she will often have the goal of buying or possessing 
one. Boudon briefly addresses the explanation of goals and illustrates it with an 
example (2014). He assumes that the educational and social goals individuals 
acquire are due to taking as a reference people “they are mainly in relation 
with.” This would yield the following equation:
(4) SEU (Educational goals) = pEI · U(Consistency with goals of important 
others)
One could speculate that having a positive relationship to important others 
and not sharing their goals is psychologically unpleasant.
In general, it seems plausible to expand the previous equation by includ-
ing other consequences. We will not explore this possibility further. For the 
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purpose of this paper it is important to note that VET is apparently capable 
of explaining preferences. 
7.3. Applying Balance Theory
There is no question that BT can be applied to explain attitudes as well. To 
illustrate, it would be unpleasant if p perceives many single features of an object 
(z1 to zn of an object x – there are thus unit relations between x and the features 
z of an object) that are positively valued and ascribed with high probability, 
but if a negative evaluation is attributed to the entire object.
In regard to the explanation of preferences BT would imply, po would be 
the positive relationship of p and the important others. If p perceives that o 
(the important others) want, for example, to attend university (x), it would be 
unpleasant not to have the same preferences.
We will not explore the details of the applications sketched before. For the 
purposes of this paper it is only of importance that BT can apparently explain 
attitudes as well as preferences.
7.4. Conclusion
It is plausible that Boudon’s explanation of attitudes and preferences could also 
be improved by applying the two social psychological theories: the selection 
problems can be solved, and irrational factors (such as affective factors) are 
included and integrated. Furthermore, the two theories clearly imply utility 
maximization. Finally, Boudon’s general claim that there needs to be only one 
theory that explains a wide range of phenomena is confirmed by the previous 
analyses.
8. The Explanation of Behavior
As was said before, the major application of VET was the explanation of behav-
ior. BT can explain behavior as well. We will show this by sketching the 
application of BT and VET with the previous Adam Smith example. This 
time, the explanandum is not the wage norm. The question we address is: will 
employers pay workers the wage they deserve according to the fairness norm 
outlined before? Assume an employer knows that there is a norm (say a law) 
that miners have to get a certain wage, and assume a miner applies for a job 
and is interviewed. The employer first makes an offer.
BT would be applied in the following way. Let the offer of p (the employer) 
be x in a pox system, where o refers to the important others. The employer 
knows what the important others (o) pay. There would thus be positive rela-
tionships between p and o on the one hand and o and x on the other. The 
expectation is thus that the wage offer would be x. 
Assume instead that the cognitive system consists of p, x1 (norm to 
pay an amount x) and x2 (payment offer x) – see figure 4. It would be dis-
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sonant not to pay the amount that is demanded by the norm. In this case, 
px2 would be negative. The system could be extended by including o and 
assuming that o pays x2 and accepts the norm x1. The reader might write 
o next to x2 and connect these elements with a line. This would result in a 
balanced system.
In order to apply VET, let us change our example to explain participation 
in the rain dance. The following consequences could be included in a behav-
ioral equation. Let there be a norm to participate in the ceremony, and let 
non-compliance be sanctioned negatively. The tribe members might value the 
company of others and they might have developed a positive attitude toward 
the ceremony itself. This yields equation 5:
(5) SEU(Participate in rain ceremony) = pPN · U(Follow the norm to partici-
pate)  –  pPS · U(Negative Sanctions for not participating)  +  pPC · U(Company 
of others)  +  pPI · U(Intrinsic Motivation of participation in the rain dance)
So far we have formulated a total of five equations. They are a hierarchical 
explanatory argument. Equation (5) includes utilities which can be explained 
by previous equations. For example, probabilities are descriptive beliefs which 
could be explained by equation (1). The norm in equation (5) can be explained 
by equation (2).
Our conclusions for the explanation of behavior are the same as those for 
the explanation of descriptive and normative beliefs, attitudes and goals (or 
preferences): the two theories solve the problems of the CM; they are incon-
sistent with Boudon’s rejection of utility maximization; and they confirm the 
generality assumption.
9.  Boudon’s Implicit Background Theory: The Wide Version of Rational 
Choice Theory
VET and BT are versions of RCT: they assume utility maximization and that 
preferences and constraints are determinants of the explananda (for details see 
below). The constraints are, for example, the perceived properties of the social 
network. Boudon is an emphatic opponent of RCT: he wrote three articles that 
attack this theory (1998, 2003, 2009b), and there are critiques in passing in 
Figure 4. Explaining Payment Offers
x2
Payment offer
x2 corresponds to x1
Acceptance
x1
Norm to pay a certain amount
p
Employer
p pays amount x2
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numerous publications. If Boudon’s critique of RCT is correct then perhaps 
BT, VET and other social psychological theories have major weaknesses so that 
it is not meaningful to apply them in order to remedy problems of the CM. 
So perhaps one replaces one evil with another. It is thus important to examine 
to what extent Boudon’s critique of RCT is tenable.
A major problem of Boudon’s critique of RCT is that he does not distinguish 
between different versions. This is of utmost importance because these versions 
face different problems. RCT is not a single theory but a family of theories. In 
general, a critique of “the” theory of rational action is completely mistaken.
In analyzing Boudon’s critique of RCT, the following questions are dis-
cussed. (1) It is first necessary to clarify which version of RCT is Boudon’s 
target: is it an outdated narrow neo-classical version or an increasingly accepted 
social psychological wide version? (2) Does Boudon’s critique hold for a wide 
version of RCT as well? (3) What are the differences between the CM and the 
wide version of RCT? (4) In regard to Boudon’s rejection of utility maximiza-
tion we examine whether his arguments are acceptable. The general conclusion 
is that the CM is consistent with a wide version of RCT.
9.1.  A Brief Outline of the Narrow and the Wide Version of Rational Choice 
Theory
There are three hypotheses that characterize every version of RCT.7 It is held 
that preferences and constraints determine behavior, and that individuals 
choose the behavior with the highest utility. The different versions impose 
restrictions on the kinds of variables and on the kind of utility that is maxi-
mized. It is useful to distinguish a narrow and a wide version. In a nutshell, 
the wide version admits a wide range of preferences and constraints and 
assumes that utility maximization occurs from the perspective of the actor. A 
narrow version does not accept these assumptions. In particular, the differ-
ences are as follows.
(1) It is often held that only egoistic preferences matter. In contrast, a wide 
version includes all kinds of preferences. In particular, altruistic preferences 
are admitted and goals to follow internalized norms.
(2) There are no restrictions on the kinds of constraints in the wide version 
either: not only material constraints, but also, for example, social sanctions 
or expectations of others are admitted (which may be constraints if they 
affect goal attainment of the actors).
(3) A narrow version assumes that reality is perceived as it is. According to a 
wide version, perceptions, or equivalently beliefs (which may be wrong), 
are explanatory variables.
7. For a detailed discussion of the different versions see Opp (1999) and Kroneberg and Kal-
ter (2012); for the role of norms in RCT see Opp (2013a, 2014a). See further Braun and 
Gautschi, (2014) for an innovative new formal model of a wide RCT version.
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(4) Utility maximization in the narrow version means that the actor chooses 
the behavior that is objectively (i.e., from the perspective of an omnisci-
ent observer) best for him or her. In a wide version, the actor chooses the 
alternative that is best from his or her perspective.
It goes without saying that the specific kinds of preferences and constraints 
that are assumed to be relevant for a behavior must be determined empirically. 
Obviously, circular reasoning or tautologies are excluded.
The wide version is increasingly accepted. To social psychologists, it is 
obvious that all kinds of motivation and perceptions are relevant. This is shown 
in numerous applications of VET. Unexpected empirical findings in econom-
ics have led to increasing skepticism about a narrow model that only admits 
egoism. For example, in the ultimatum and dictator game people typically 
apply fairness norms. The assumption of pure egoism would suggest that a 
subject in an experiment who can decide to keep a given amount of money 
or share part of it with an unknown subject would keep the whole amount. 
Actually, this happens rarely (see, for example, Henrich et al., 2004). In the 
same vein, the phenomenon of altruistic punishment (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 
2002) and much work in behavioral economics that points to subtle incentives 
(e.g., Thaler and Sunstein, 2009 and Ariely, 2009) are not compatible with a 
narrow version of RCT.
This short discussion indicates that it is absolutely necessary in critiques 
of RCT to distinguish different versions. It is a major problem of Boudon’s 
critique of RCT that he attacks RCT as if it is one theory and not a whole 
family of theories. 
9.2. Boudon’s Critique of Rational Choice Theory and His Alternative
To be sure, Boudon grants that rational choice theory “is a family of theories with 
many versions” (2009b: 180). But he does not address their differences in detail. 
Instead, he presents six postulates (2003: 3-4, see also 2009b: 180) that describe 
RCT “in a general way” (2009b: 180) – see the summary in Table 1. But he does 
not show which of these postulates pertain to which version. As a matter of fact, 
the postulates address a mixture of the wide and the narrow version. The former 
seems to be Boudon’s CM. Let us look at the postulates in detail. 
Boudon’s first postulate P1 with which he characterizes RCT is meth-
odological individualism, that is, the claim to explain macro phenomena by 
processes on the micro level. This is shared by every version of RCT. P1 is 
thus consistent with the CM and Boudon’s methodological orientation. P1 
as well as P2 refer to the interpretive sociology (“Verstehende Soziologie”) of 
Max Weber (Boudon, 2009b: 186). P2 contends that the “meaning” of an 
action to an individual is an explanatory variable, and this meaning consists 
of the reasons that an actor regards as valid (2009b: 192). P3 is an equivalent 
formulation of P2. P1 to P3 characterize what Boudon calls “the general theory 
of rationality” (2009b: 186). It is equivalent to the CM.
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There can be no doubt that these postulates are in line with the wide ver-
sion of RCT. Micro-macro explanations are a major goal of proponents of this 
version, and “reasons” are included in this version as well.
P4 to P6 are, Boudon argues, only sometimes true. They are the distin-
guishing features of RCT and the CM. This can only mean that these are 
postulates of the narrow version. Let us look at these postulates in more detail.
P4 clearly differs for the two versions of RCT. Boudon asserts that RCT 
can only deal with “instrumental rationality.” This excludes internalized 
norms. Norm following in this sense is not “instrumental,” in contrast to 
pursuing goals like earning more money. However, those who act according 
to internalized norms also pursue goals, namely following a norm or avoiding 
a bad conscience (for details see Opp, 2013a). One might distinguish several 
kinds of goals. Some goals refer to external states (such as earning money), 
others to internal states (such as doing one’s duty). A wide version of RCT 
includes all kinds of goals. Pursuing norms is explicitly a motivation in the 
wide version and in the CM.
P5 (see also Boudon, 2012a: 17) is certainly correct for applications of 
RCT in many fields such as economics. Egoistic preferences are the only driv-
ing force of actors. But a wide version of RCT holds that any preferences may 
be explanatory factors. Accordingly, preferences may vary: people may more 
Table 1. Boudon’s Characterization of Rational Choice Theory, the Narrow and Wide Version 
of Rational Choice Theory and Boudon’s “Cognitivist Model” (CM)
Postulates
Rational Choice Theory:  
Boudon’s characterization
Consistency of the postulates with the 
narrow, the wide version and the CM
P1 “[A]ny phenomenon is the effect of indi-
vidual decisions, actions, attitudes etc.” 
(methodological individualism). 
This refers to micro-macro explanations 
which is a goal of any version of RCT and 
of the CM.
P2 “[I]n principle, an action can be 
understood.”
The action’s meaning (i.e., the reasons of 
an action) to the actor is important. P2 is 
held by the wide version and the CM.
P3 “[A]ny action is caused by reasons in the 
mind of individuals” (rationality postulate).
P3 is identical with the wide version and 
the CM.
P4 “[T]hese reasons [see P3] derive from 
consideration by the actor of the conse-
quences of his or her actions as he sees 
them” (consequentialism, instrumentalism).
Restrictions to “instrumentalism” in a 
narrow sense (see the text) are an assump-
tion only in the narrow version of RCT. The 
wide version and the CM address norm 
compliance and other motivations.
P5 “[A]ctors are concerned mainly with the 
consequences to themselves of their 
own action” (egoism).
Restrictions to egoistic motivations are an 
assumption only in the narrow version. All 
kinds of motivations are admitted in the 
wide version and the CM.
P6 “[A]ctors choose the line of action with the 
most favorable balance” (maximization, 
optimization).
Boudon rejects P6. Plausible: Boudon 
assumes that actors maximize subjective 
utility (see text). This is consistent with the 
wide version of RCT.
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or less take into account others’ welfare (i.e., may be altruistic). At least this is 
explicitly considered as a possible motive in the wide version. In commenting 
on P5, Boudon criticizes that RCT does not explain normative phenomena. 
However, as has been argued before, RCT can actually be applied for explain-
ing these phenomena as well. Anyway, Boudon’s critique does not hold for 
the wide version. Furthermore, the claim not to restrict the theory to egoism 
is endorsed in the CM as well.
P6 means, Boudon asserts, that actors maximize utility from the perspec-
tive of an impartial and omniscient observer. This is held by proponents of a 
narrow version, but definitely not by those who advance a wide version. Here 
the hypothesis is that actors engage in subjective utility maximization. This 
means that actors do what they think is best for them in a given situation. 
Boudon rejects P6 without making any distinction about different versions of 
this assumption. We will return to P6 in the next sub-section.
In other writings where Boudon criticizes RCT without mentioning the 
previous postulates explicitly, he clearly refers to the narrow version. For exam-
ple, he asserts that RCT “introduces the fiction of a solipsistic homo sociologicus, 
whereas the CM recognizes the homo sociologicus as a social being” (2012b: 18). 
This critique is clearly directed towards the narrow version. Obviously, the 
social environment imposes various costs and benefits on actors and is taken 
account of in a wide version and in the CM as well (see in particular Boudon, 
2014: XX). In his preface to a collection of his essays in German (2013), he 
asserts that rational choice theory “postulates that the reasons which stimulate 
individuals are egoistic and instrumental,” whereas in his CM there can be 
“supraindividual and cognitive reasons” (translation by KDO). The former 
are clearly a characterization of the narrow version, whereas the latter – if it 
means that reasons might be shared by a group of individuals – refer to the 
wide version.
Boudon’s critique of the narrow version can be illustrated with his discus-
sion of so-called “paradoxes,” in particular with the paradox of voting (see, 
for example, Boudon, 2003: 6-7; 2012a: 7-8) that, in his opinion, RCT is not 
able to solve. From a narrow RCT it follows that nobody will participate in 
an election because a single voter has no influence on the outcome of an elec-
tion. In reality, however, we find that election participation is far from zero. 
From the perspective of a wide version, various kinds of costs and benefits (in 
M. Olson’s terms: selective incentives) may have an impact on voting. Which 
ones are important has to be tested empirically.8 Boudon strongly criticizes 
this procedure. His argument is that introducing these other incentives is ad 
hoc and unacceptable. The exact reasons for this critique are not clear. RCT is 
a general theory that says that preferences and constraints influence individual 
behavior and that people do what they think is best for them. The theory 
imposes no limitations on the kinds of preferences and constraints. These 
8. For a more detailed discussion of Boudon’s analysis of the paradox of voting, see Opp 
(2014a) and also Opp (2001). 
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limitations – such as only considering egoistic preferences or ignoring internal-
ized norms – are introduced ad hoc. The social psychological version of VET 
shows this clearly: no social psychologist sees any problem in introducing all 
empirically relevant consequences and testing their influence. This procedure 
is by no means ad hoc in order to “salvage” the theory (Boudon, 1998: 821), 
it is embodied in the theory. This critique is strange because factors such as 
(false) beliefs are also ingredients of the CM.
As was said before, the CM lacks an explicit reference to utility maximiza-
tion. We will therefore discuss this assumption in more detail in the following 
section.
9.3.  A Reconstruction of Boudon’s Implicit Use of the Assumption of Utility 
Maximization
It happens that scientists explicitly reject certain hypotheses or methodological 
rules but actually apply them. For example, many scholars are against rational 
choice theory but actually apply it in their work (which holds, incidentally, for 
Analytical Sociology, see Opp, 2013b). This might be the case with Boudon’s 
work as well. It is therefore instructive to look at some of Boudon’s examples 
in order to examine the extent to which he implicitly assumes utility maxi-
mization.
Boudon tries to explain why clerks in a firm had violent conflicts on minor 
issues such as “being seated closer to a source of heat or light” (1996: 144 – 
the example is based on C.W. Mills’s White Collar from 1951). A “cognitivist 
interpretation” of this “overreaction paradox” (2009b: 183) is the following. 
All workers get equal pay and their work is similar. There is further a norm that 
contributions to the production should match rewards. Any unequal reward 
(such as sitting closer to a window) is perceived and intolerable. As soon as the 
advantage of sitting close to a window is due to the decision of a supervisor 
it is an injustice. From a “utilitarian viewpoint” (as Boudon puts it), sitting 
close to a window matters little, but it is regarded as an injustice and therefore 
instigates conflicts.
Boudon claims that this is contrary to RCT. This is wrong when a wide 
version is used: norms such as equal pay for equal work are included as pos-
sible factors, and it is also possible to include environmental factors such as the 
workplace in the explanation. They are perceived constraints. So far, then, the 
explanation of the CM and the wide version of RCT do not differ. 
However, the wide version would further argue that eliminating the injus-
tice makes individuals better off. Thus, if this elimination is brought about 
by the conflicts, individuals prefer the new situation to the previous one. This 
is exactly what Boudon implicitly assumes. The conflicts are solved when no 
one has a privilege such as sitting close to a window. And this is in the interest 
of the workers – which is implied in the example. This is equivalent to argu-
ing that solving the conflicts makes the workers better off or maximizes their 
subjective utility.
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Let us look at the Adam Smith example again. Boudon’s argument lacks 
a central explanatory step if an assumption about utility maximization is not 
included. On the one hand, Boudon writes that violation of a justice norm 
results in a “disequilibrium” (see the quotation above), which is obviously 
unpleasant. In other words, this situation is costly. Boudon’s implicit assump-
tion is that individuals want to avoid the disequilibrium. If this is not assumed, 
why is the disequilibrium regarded as relevant for the explanation? Isn’t the 
assumption also that avoiding the disequilibrium is better for individuals than 
staying with the disequilibrium? Thus, individuals choose what is best for 
them. This is the assumption of subjective utility maximization.
Another assumption in this example is that the general fairness norm 
implies the acceptance of the norm that miners should get a higher salary. 
Why do individuals accept the implication of the general norm? Apparently, 
individuals would feel uneasy if they would not. This would be costly. Further-
more, accepting the implication is best from the viewpoint of the individual.
Utility maximization is further plausible when we imagine that the Austral-
ian tribes come into contact with modern science and learn that the traditional 
belief that rain dances generate rain is wrong. They are taught which processes 
lead to rain. Assume further that the new beliefs are acquired because they are 
convincing. The latter term means that they are regarded as true or superior 
to the competing traditional belief. 
One explanatory step is missing: if modern science is convincing: why will 
the traditional beliefs be given up? Why not hold both types of beliefs? Appar-
ently, holding both beliefs (i.e., beliefs that are inconsistent such as “p and 
non-p”) is highly unpleasant, and therefore costly. It is not only cognitively 
unpleasant but will also be punished by important others. If you tell your 
friends, for example, that you believe “apples are healthy” and “apples are not 
healthy,” you will be considered feeble-minded.
Holding a belief that is regarded as wrong further violates goals that most 
people subscribe to, namely, knowing the truth (at least for some matters). 
Reaching such a goal is beneficial. That is to say, not accepting a true state-
ment is a cost.
In addition, accepting the belief supported by modern science has concrete 
advantages. The time and other resources invested in performing the rain 
dances could be used for setting up irrigating systems. Thus, giving up the 
false belief is clearly a benefit, and holding it is a cost.
The confrontation with modern science will probably lead to rejecting an 
entire system of traditional beliefs and replacing it with a new belief system. 
This is not only a question of just checking what is acceptable (see the previ-
ous quotation from Boudon, 1998: 824). It is a painful psychological process 
where some form of subjective utility maximization is involved.
Thus, in general, arguing that an actor prefers a (descriptive or normative) 
belief A to another belief B (or an action A to another action B) because he or 
she has good reasons for A and not B, means that he or she has better reasons 
for A than for B. This means that there is some choice, and that an individual 
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is better off when a certain belief is chosen and not another. In other words, 
the actor chooses what is subjectively better for him or her. This holds for the 
choice between descriptive beliefs, normative beliefs (see the discussion in Opp, 
2013a, see also Opp, 2001), attitudes, preferences and behaviors.
These examples illustrate that Boudon seems to implicitly assume that 
actors do what they think is best for them. This is actually subjective utility 
maximization. If this is granted, then the CM is consistent with the wide ver-
sion of RCT.
Many formulations in Boudon’s work come very close to or are even iden-
tical to the hypothesis of utility maximization. For example, the CM states 
that “social actors try to act in congruence with reasons they perceive as valid” 
(2009b: 192). Why do they try to reach congruence if that doesn’t make the 
actors better off? Another statement by Boudon is that an actor prefers the 
theory that accounts “for given phenomena in the most satisfying possible way 
(in accordance with given criteria)” (2009b: 184). “Satisfying” points to the 
fact that acceptance is “more satisfying” than non-acceptance – a clear case of 
subjective utility maximization. Given various goals, Boudon argues (2009b: 
193), actors “are rational in the sense that they look for the best or at least for 
a satisfactory system of reasons able to provide a ground to their answer.” Can 
there be a clearer description of subjective utility maximization?
But assume we accept Boudon’s claim. What is the alternative to subjective 
utility maximization? In regard to beliefs, the answer that an actor accepts a 
belief that is convincing begs the question of why this is done. Why not keep 
the old belief?
What are Boudon’s explicit arguments against utility maximization? Let us 
look at some quotations. The CM “is drawn from the ‘rational-choice model’ 
by lifting the restriction that the reasons of social actors should always be of 
the cost-benefit type” (1996: 124). In another article, Boudon argues (1998: 
824): “endorsing a theory is a noninstrumental action … the question the actor 
is confronted with here is not to maximize a cost-benefit balance, but to check 
whether, to the best of his knowledge, an idea is acceptable.” It is striking that 
no empirical evidence is provided for his rejection of utility maximization. 
He just asserts that it is false. Furthermore, Boudon does not put forward an 
alternative proposition.
The most important argument against Boudon’s claim is that it is incon-
sistent with major social psychological theories. This holds true for the two 
theories applied before, but also for other theories such as learning theories. 
Their assumption which is usually not formulated in an explicit way is that 
individuals choose a situation that they think is best for them, in a given situ-
ation.
10. General Conclusions
Boudon’s basic idea that everything social scientists are interested in can be 
explained by a single theory is new and has been confirmed in the previous 
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analyses. This should encourage social scientists to try to expand the range of 
application of their theories to encompass not only behavior. It would be an 
important research program to work on an encompassing theory that Boudon 
had in mind.
The basic idea of Boudon’s theory that beliefs (i.e., “reasons”) are explanatory 
variables of a wide range of phenomena is nowadays widely accepted in quite 
different schools of the social sciences. However, alternative approaches focusing 
on objectivist propositions such as a narrow RCT and on methodological col-
lectivism are still strong. So discussing Boudon’s work and expanding it may in 
general strengthen a subjective approach that is advocated by this author as well.
The title of the paper is “The Explanation of Everything.” Are there ques-
tions social scientists are interested in that are not addressed by the CM? The 
answer is yes. Among the questions not answered by Boudon’s theory are at 
least the following. (1) The question of when a behavior is planned and when 
enacted spontaneously has become a focus of social sciences since the rising 
interest in dual-process theories. This question has not yet been addressed 
in the present paper and I have not found any detailed analysis in Boudon’s 
work either. (2) Another issue is the role of objective factors in the formation 
of beliefs. We know at least since the work of Kahneman and Tversky that 
misperceptions are ubiquitous. But we still know little about the conditions of 
when people believe what. (3) When does a negative attitude develop toward 
a behavior and when does a norm come into being? For example: when do 
people not like it when somebody smokes in their presence, and when does a 
norm emerge that one should not smoke in one’s presence? This question is 
rarely addressed in the literature and is not dealt with in the CM either. But 
perhaps Boudon would answer: a norm and not only an attitude will emerge if 
the actor has good reasons for demanding something. This raises the question 
of what these reasons might be.
For this writer, the most fascinating part of reading Boudon’s presentations 
of his theory was his creative use of the work of classical writers, in particular 
Max Weber, Émile Durkheim and Alexis de Tocqueville. Boudon’s reconstruc-
tions of these explanations are fascinating in their own right. 
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